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BOOK REVIEWS
PUBLIC REGULATION OF THE RELIGIOUS USE OF LAND: A DE-
TAILED AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF A HUNDRED COURT CASES, by
James E. Curry. Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company, 1964.
Pp. xxii, 429. $12.50.
What is the proper relationship between church and state? This
is a critical issue for our time and it holds a myriad of sub-issues.
Curry's book deals with one of these sub-issues: To what extent
may the state1 regulate the religious use of land? Since Curry's
book is the first book to treat exclusively with that sub-issue, it is
a "landmark" and deserves considerable attention for that reason
alone.
2
One might first ask: Is a 429 page book on this sub-issue justi-
fied? I believe that it is. During the more than forty years that
courts have been considering church zoning 3 cases many judges and
other legal writers as well as lay people have stated the view that
churches cannot be excluded from a residential area on any basis
by direct zoning. Apparently some extend this view to exclusion
by indirect action, such as through requiring setback lines, regulat-
ing building area and height, and requiring off-street parking. These
"absolutist" views 4 have little legal precedent; further it seems that
frequently they have been arrived at with little consideration of
all relevant factors. Religion, based primarily on faith, readily
brings emotion into play; and emotion can color one's analysis
rather quickly. The primary thrusts of Curry's book are to dispel
the absolutist view, at least to the extent that it purports to rest
on legal precedent, and to set forth and evaluate the factors that
have been considered by the courts in these one hundred cases.
Not everyone will agree with all of Curry's specific conclusions on
policy or with his analysis of all of the individual cases and law
review commentaries, but this book should cause anyone concerned
with legal precedent in church zoning cases to take a long hard
1. Usually the regulation would be through local government units exercising dele-
gated power.
2. There have been five other reviews of this book: Bartley, Book Review, 17 U. FLA.
L. REV. 650 (1965) ; Brindel, Book Review, 40 NOTRE DAME LAw. 492 (1965) ; Casad, Book
Review, 13 KAN. L. REv. 614 (1965) ; Fagan, Book Review, 11 CATHOLIC LAW. 173 (1965)
Green, Book Review, 43 N.C.L. REv. 655 (1965).
3. Curry considers other regulation aspects than zoning and they are clearly involved
in the cases; in the review I shall use the term "zoning," generally intending to include
all aspects of public regulation of the religious use of land.
4. There are absolutists on the other side saying that any chur3h usage ought to be
entirely excludable. These are of less concern since their views have not received much
sanction. Curry has no greater liking for them than he has for the anti-exclusion abso'
lutist.
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look at a particular case or law review commentary before relying
on it as support for the absolutist theory.
The first three chapters are introductory. Chapter one relates
the specific topic of this book to other church-state problems and
to land use regulation in general. It refers to some of the early
cases and literature touching the problem and to the magnitude of
church construction today. Chapter two takes an introductory look
at the "police power," the power under which the zoning must be
upheld if at all, and sets forth three bases of attack that a church
might use against the validity of the zoning: (1) The zoning does
not bear a substantial relation to the promotion of public health,
safety, morals or general welfare and is therefore an improper ex-
ercise of the police power resulting in a deprivation of property
without due process of law; (2) the zoning treats a substantially
identical entity differently and therefore discriminates against the
church denying it equal protection of the law; (3) the zoning unduly
restricts the free exercise of religion. Zoning might result in a
denial of due process even where it bears a substantial relation
to promoting public health, safety, morals or general welfare, if it
deprives the owner of all practical uses of his property. The result
is confiscatory, in effect a "taking" of property without just com-
pensation, and therefore certainly a denial of due process. The
situation probably would not arise frequently in church zoning cases
since generally the property denied usage for church purposes would
be suitable for at least one other valuable purpose. In chapter three
Curry specifically attacks the absolutist theories and succeeds in
demonstrating rather forcefully the weakness of the claims that
these theories are based on legal precedent, although at times he
seems to be attacking straws.
Curry criticises an article for relying on Western Theological
Seminary v. City5 to support the statement that ". . . [C]hurches
may not be barred from residential zones. '" First, the quotation
from the article is misleading for it attributes the view to the
author that the rule is universal. The article author actually said:
"After citing a number of cases in which it was held that churches
may not be barred from residential zones, the court said . . .-
Second, it is not at all clear that the article author was relying on
the Western case. He made no specific reference to it; one must
go to the case under discussion in the article to find any citations
at all. Curry's first criticism is "Actually it was not a church that
was attempted to be barred . . but a college." 8 The article
5. 325 Ill. 511, 156 N.E. 778 (1927), 331 Ill. 257, 162 N.E. 863 (1928).
6. Brindel, Zoning Out Religious Institutions, 32 NOTRE DAME LAW. 627, 628 (1957)
see Curry, PUBLIC REGULATION OF THE RELIGIOUS USE OF LAND 29, 30 (1964), hereinafter
cited simply as Curry.
7. Brindel, supra note 6, at 628. (Emphasis added.)
8. Curry at 30.
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author knew that this case did not involve a church for within
one-half of a page of the place cited by Curry he refers to the
case specifically as dealing with a "religious school.", Since he
was talking about churches, since this case did not involve a church
and since cases involving churches were cited by the court perhaps
one should conclude that the article was not referring to this case.
Turn about seems like fair play. On page 110 Curry refers to the
"Upper Arlington Lutheran high school case." Actually it was not
a high school that was involved but a church.
The next eleven chapters present a more detailed analysis of
the three bases for attacking the validity of church zoning. Chapter
four discusses generally what the courts have said about whether
or not the church zoning bears a substantial relation to legitimate
public ends and the "balancing of interests" approach thereto.
Arguably, the balancing of the churches' social value, apart from
the free exercise of religion question, with the extent that public
health, safety, morals or general welfare, would be promoted by
the zoning should be done by the legislative body and the court
should content itself with answering the question: Is there a reason-
able basis for saying that the zoning substantially promotes some
public end? On the other hand, because of the preferred status
of "freedom of religion," balancing it with the exercise of the state's
police power might be considered best left to the courts. A third
aspect of balancing is that of equity's quest to determine whether
it ought on specific facts to issue its discretionary remedy-the
injunction. The chapter shows that the courts have not conveniently
segregated the three. Also discussed in chapter four is the tradi-
tional equitable defense of estoppel.
Chapters five through ten present an evaluation of what various
courts have said about certain specific factors: aesthetics; space,
light, air and ease of access; fiscal considerations; protection of
property value; protection of neighbors; and traffic control. As Cur-
ry rightly points out these "justifications" for the exercise of the
police power seldom appear alone in a case; several are usually
considered, and more than one may be the basis for the decision.
Furthermore, there is bound to be overlap in the considerations.
Obviously traffic problems and aesthetics affect property value.
They are as relevant to the "protection of neighbors" as the specific
categories therein considered, "noise," "mere inconvenience," "de-
pressiveness," "disturbances of the peace," and "police, fire, health
and sanitary regulations." One can easily argue that affectation
of property value is but a consequence from attendant factors such
as noise and traffic. But discussion has to be organized somehow
and the courts do use these categorizations. Curry's conclusions
9. BrIndel, supra note 6, at 629.
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are that traffic control has the most support from the courts, that
aesthetic considerations will offer the best argument for zoning out
churches entirely from residential areas and that fiscal considera-
tions may well have much greater significance in the future than
they have now. As church building booms, more property goes off
the tax rolls and more city services have to be provided; the result
is a growing dual loss of revenue to the community.
Chapters eleven through fourteen deal primarily with the dis-
crimination question, eleven treating it generally and the other
chapters treating specific aspects. Thus chapter twelve is devoted
to spot zoning and reverse discrimination raising the interesting
question of what secular uses will be entitled to admission into a
district once a church is permitted. Chapter thirteen discusses dis-
crimination between religious schools and "public" schools, and
chapter fourteen presents an interesting discussion of "suspicions
of prejudice" based either on religious bias or on prior conduct
of the individual or group involved. Curry points out that courts
have been reluctant to discuss prejudice in the church fact situation
and feels strongly that this aspect of the problem ought to be more
fully explored by them.
Chapter fifteen explores religious liberty, noting its infrequent
use as a basis of attack and suggesting further reliance on it. Cur-
ry's suggestion that ordinarily it ought to prevail only when there
is no "reasonably accessible alternative site" seems sound. The
important distinction brought out is that between the personal right
not to be unduly interfered with in the exercise of one's religion
on the one hand and the public service that a particular religion
performs on the other hand. The first is relevant to this issue; the
second is not.
The book then reverts back to some general considerations.
Chapter sixteen treats the role of precedent. Curry sharply
criticizes courts for basing their opinions on "fragments" of prior
legal opinions instead of on the full opinions, but he does a substan-
tial amount of fragmentizing on his own throughout his book. Most
of it he does by choosing extremely narrow grounds for explaining
a court's decision, labeling it holding and characterizing the rest
as dicta or, by what seems to be one of his favorite phrases, as
"makeweight.,,10
Chapter seventeen discusses the presumption of legality and the
burden of proof. The primary problem here discussed is whether
or not the courts will apply the usual presumption in favor of the
validity of zoning to church zoning or put the burden immediately
on the governmental body to substantiate its validity. Chapter
10. See diacussion infra, at notes 14-28.
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eighteen deals with the interpretation of zoning board regulations
including relevant consideration of the necessity for standards, the
use of conditions, strict and liberal approaches to interpretation,
and severability. Zoning ordinances frequently refer to "churches"
or to "religious" use. The problem of determining their meaning
is treated separately in chapter nineteen. An interesting question
that arises is how much the court should look to the doctrines of
the particular group involved to determine whether one of its ac-
tivities is "religious." Chapter twenty dealing with the relevance
of private opinion is divided into two basic parts, a consideration
of "neighbor consent clauses" in zoning ordinances and a consider-
ation of "extra-legal private pressure" brought to bear on zoning
board members, judges and others connected with the zoning proc-
ess. A brief summary and conclusion comprises chapter twenty-
three. Chapters twenty-one and twenty-two are a rehash of the
cases discussed previously; in chapter twenty-one the state cases
are summarized by state, with twenty-seven states involved, and
in chapter twenty-two the relevant federal cases are discussed with
some discussion of why there are so few of them.
The preceding material covers 336 pages of the book. The re-
maining 92 pages are devoted to (1) a chronological table of refer-
ences or what serves as footnotes; 11 (2) an alphabetical list of
references under the separate headings of "books"; "periodicals,
etc."; "articles, addresses, etc."; "authors"; "religious denomina-
tions"; "municipalities"; "states"; and "cases"; 12 and (3) a subject
index.' 8 The unusual manner of footnoting and the failure to refer
to cases by standard case names probably will be confusing to
lawyer readers at first. The index is good; query if all the tables
serve a useful purpose. One thing that the table on "religious de-
nominations" shows is that there have been 21 cases involving Cath-
olics, 17 cases involving Jews, 13 cases involving Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, 9 cases involving Baptists, and 8 cases involving Lutherans.
No other denomination had five or more cases.
Although Curry generally does well in criticizing the absolutist
rules, in attacking those who have purported to find precedent for
their absolutist views, and in offering some new insights into the
basic problem, he does not do so well in his affirmative analysis
of precedent. Several illustrations must suffice although more are
available.
Curry says of State v. Joseph14 that "the court's ruling was
based on certain representations made by zoning officials to the
church. From these representations the church concluded that a
11. Approximately 231h pages.
12. Approximately 21 pages.
13. Approximately 441h pages
14. 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 575 (1942).
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specified lot would be suitable for the project and bought it. As
a result, the court held that the church could not properly be ex-
cluded. Most of Justice Bettman's observations were not necessary
to the decision and therefore not binding as precedent."' 15 Now,
the Joseph case has been cited frequently in support of the absolutist
theory that churches cannot be totally eliminated from a residential
area. All that the court said .directly with respect to this proposition
was "we seriously question the constitutionality of any enactment
that seeks flatly to prohibit the erection of churches in residential
districts. But we believe that under a proper and natural construc-
tion of the language of the ordinance here involved, this question
does not arise."'16 Thus Curry is on sound ground when he criticizes
those who espouse an absolutist view from this case. The ordinance
permitted churches by special permit of the zoning commission and
village council. The church argued that its exclusion bore no sub-
stantial relation to the police power purposes-public health, safety,
morals and general welfare-and that the village had given a pre-
liminary approval on which the church had relied to its detriment
so that the village ought to be estopped. What the Court said con-
cerning the estoppel argument was "Although this resolution was
subsequently repealed and declared to have been 'advisory only,'
and although its adoption may not, under the circumstances, rise to
the dignity of an estoppel, it does at least give a strong indication
that in the minds of a majority of the respondents there was no
very clear repugnancy between the erection of a church in a class I
district, and the general pattern of uses prescribed in the ordi-
nance."' 1 7 In other words, what the court does with the village's
earlier action is not to hold that it works an estoppel but to treat
it in effect as opinion evidence on the question whether or not
the exclusion of the church bears a substantial relation to the promo-
tion of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. The court
then proceeds to examine the village's argument:
Their principal objections flow from the fact that at regular
intervals the church will bring together large groups of
people, thereby allegedly causing increased noise and con-
fusion, increased traffic congestion and parking difficulties,
and an increased influx of strangers into the community.
It is also said that erection of a church would adversely
affect property values of adjacent land.' s
First the court disposes of the adverse affect to adjacent property
values argument by saying that it is not a separate ground but
is the result of the other factors-noise, traffic. The court finds
15. Curry at 10.
16. 39 N.E.2d at 520. (Emphasis added.)
17. Id. at 521.
18. Id. at 523.
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the noise argument insignificant because the church had agreed not
to install bells or chimes, and "people going to and from church are
not customarily rowdy or boisterous," and on three sides there are
streets with a minimum dedicated width of 50 feet and much of
the land in the vicinity is vacant. The traffic argument fails because
(1) the church has streets on three sides; (2) there was an express
agreement to set aside 25 percent of the lot for parking; and
(3) the traffic would occur generally only on Sunday morning when
other traffic would be less and children would not be going to
school. Thus "health and safety" have failed to sustain the zoning.
The court then considers "morals" and finds it incongruous to use
morals as a ground for excluding the church when churches have
"traditionally occupied the role of both teacher and guardian of
morals." And since "churches in fitting surroundings are an in-
spiration" putting them in nonresidential areas cannot be supported
as being for the general welfare. The net result is an inescapable
conclusion that the court found the exclusion of this church was
not justifiable as bearing any substantial relation to the promotion
of public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Why then does
Curry conclude "that decision, it will be recalled, relied principally
on the misrepresentations of the zoning officials on the basis of
which the church had invested its money in the disputed tract.
But as a makeweight for its conclusions, the court said the follow-
ing: (quoting the court's comment regarding no support for the
zoning on general welfare grounds) . . ."?19 Undoubtedly Curry
reaches this conclusion because of what the same court said in a
later case: "Reduced to its lowest terms, the decision in that case
[Joseph] was based upon the extremely important and unusual fact
that the relator had been misled by the zoning and village com-
missions .... -20 It could of course be argued that this restrictive
language was unnecessary, the court having already found that
using the land for "school" purposes "would substantially and perma-
mantly injure the appropriate use of the neighboring property and
lower its value. 12 1 In the church case the court found no reasonable
relationship to the police powers, here it did; the cases could be
distinguished on that basis. Three of the six judges who decided
the church case approved this statement in the latter case, two
were no longer on the bench and one rejected it. Any thorough
discussion of the reasons for the holding in Joseph ought to bring
all of this out; various parts are brought out by Curry here and
there but not sufficiently to set off the impact from his two com-
ments quoted earlier.
Curry rightly criticizes an article which relied on Ellsworth v.
19. Curry at 216.
20. State v. Baxter, 149 Ohio St. 221, 74 N.E.2d 242, 244 (1947).
21. Id, at 244.
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Giercke2 2 to support the statement "That an ordinance totally ex-
cluding churches from a residential neighborhood is invalid, has
been clearly resolved."28 As he points out, the court did not discuss
the total exclusion aspect at all but specifically said "For the fore-
going reasons we hold that the ordinance involved herein is uncon-
stitutional and discriminatory in so far as it excludes the building
of churches within a class 'A' residential district." 2' What were the
"foregoing reasons" that the court gave? The court quoted with
approval from the Joseph case the following:
Churches in fitting surroundings are an inspiration. ....
To require that churches be banished to the business dis-
trict, crowded alongside filling stations and grocery stores,
is clearly not to be justified on the score of promoting the
general welfare.
We do not believe it is a proper function in government
to interfere in the name of the public to exclude churches
from residential districts for the purpose of securing to
adjacent landowners the benefits of exclusive residential
restrictions.
25
This language suggests a conclusion that there was no showing
that the zoning could be justified as substantially promoting the
general welfare. It is not clear whether justifications based on
public health, safety or morals were argued. The court went on to
say:
Under this zoning ordinance an owner of property
within the district involved may maintain horses, cows and
swine on his premises and store fertilizer as long as it is
not 'stored within fifty feet of the lot line of any adjoining
owner.' 26
This language supports the conclusion that the ordinance was dis-
criminating against churches. Arguably, we now have "reasons."
(1) There was no showing that the zoning promoted any legitimate
public ends under the police power; therefore it denied due process.
(2) The zoning discriminated against churches; therefore it denied
equal protection. But Curry in explaining the decision converts
"reasons" to "reason" when he says: "The exclusion was held
unconstitutional not because it was total but because it was discrim-
inatory. '27 He makes this conversion explicit later when he quotes
the above language concerning swine and continues inside quotation
22. 62 Ariz. 198, 156 P.2d 242 (1945).
23. Sharff, Religion and the Zoning Laws, 15 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 194, 195 (1960)
Curry at 84.
24. 156 P.2d at 244.
25. Id. at 244.
26. Ibid.
27. Curry at 34.
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marks: "For the foregoing reason, we hold that the ordinance . . .




LEGAL POSITIVISM, by Samuel I. Shuman. Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 1963. Pp. vi, 265. $8.50.
The theory of law labeled legal positivism as opposed to theories
of law known as natural law often has been discussed and frequently
misunderstood, even by lawyers. The differences between the two
approaches to discovering what law is has been summarized by
contrasting the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes, "... that truth was
the majority vote of that nation that could lick all others,"' with
the conclusion of St. Thomas Aquinas, that, "Consequently every
human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived
from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law
of nature, it is no longer law but a perversion of law."
'2
Mr. Shuman's initial effort in this book is to analyze and clarify
the differences between these theories of what law basically is.
The remainder of this book is divided into two principal parts, which
may be called the philosophic discussion, and the philosopher's
argument.
The author commences his clarification of the differences be-
tween legal positivism and natural law concepts by divorcing legal
positivism from analytical jurisprudence. In his view analytical
jurisprudence is concerned with the meanings or usages of terms
indigenous to law and their relations with one another and to the
rest of language. He further holds that analytical jurisprudence
is a method of doing jurisprudence, while legal positivism is an
explanation of what law is. The author further argues that to be
accurately called legal positivism, that theory of law must hold
to two basic conclusicns: First, that law and morals are separate;
and, second, that morals have a certain nature separate from law.
In contrast to legal positivism Mr. Shuman explains that any
natural law theory requires a dependence upon a moral or ethical
standard outside the statement of law itself. Such external standards
must also provide for the satisfaction of necessary conditions before
a system of social order can be called a legal system. Inferentially,
such conditions would also have to be met before an act of a legis-
lature, a decision of a court, or a decree of an executive could
28. Curry at 138.
*Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law, B.S.L.,
1958, LL.B., 1960, University of Minnesota.
1. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1918).
2. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, TREATISE ON LAW, question 95, Art. 2.
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properly be called a law. Probable solutions to the problem of
obedience to a law which fails to meet such standard are discussed
in the book, but are beyond the scope of this review. If the pre-
conditions are "moral" in a strict sense the author asserts that
the standard would be found outside the nature of man, that is to
say from God. However, if the preconditions are "ethical" in the
strict sense the standard would be found within the nature of man
as a social being.
Having thus stated the proposition for discussion the author
proceeds to his philosophic discussion, which occupies the greater
portion of the book. The term "philosophic discussion" is used
here to describe Mr. Shuman's formal exposition on the nature
of law. This exposition presents answers to the philosophic con-
clusions of earlier writers on this subject. Whether Mr. Schuman
has succeeded in either refuting or affirming the conclusions of
these writers depends upon the force of his arguments, and upon
the prior conclusions of any particular reader. Mr. Shuman's analy-
sis of the nature of law contained in his chapters entitled, "Ethics
and Obligation," and the "Is Ought Dichotomy," and the other chap-
ters in this part of the book appears to be directed principally to
accomplished students of philosophy. Throughout his discussion the
mention of a philosopher's name or of his treatise was intended to
evoke in the reader an appreciation of the given writer's arguments
and conclusions on the point under discussion. It should be observed
that the method used permits a concise statement of a wide range
of differing opinions on the subject, which would be readily under-
stood by the audience for whom it was intended.
In contrast to the part of the book just described, Mr. Schu-
man's concluding argument in support of a natural law approach
to legal philosophy is plainly stated for all to understand. He argues
that the operation of a legal system according to a philosophy of
legal positivism is a luxury that can be safely indulged in only by
a stable society. His historic case in point is the failure of the
German legal system to halt or impede Hitler's rise to power,
and its failure to resist his "legalization" of policies which can
only be described as disastrous to social order in Germany. The
Nazi government's systematic extermination of German Jews before
and during World War II is the implicit example of such policies.
KIRK SMITH*
*Grand Forks County Judge. Ph.B., 1956, J.D., 1957, University of North Dakota,
